A lot of research has attempted to correlate demographic differences with political preferences. Generalizations (sometimes backed by data) are that younger people and minorities tend to prefer Democrats, and older white people tend to prefer Republicans. Besides the more traditional divisions of age (generational cohort), race, gender and income, other social divisions have been identified based on “cultural” and community factors; i.e., rural vs. urban, higher education (college and above) or not, religious/churchgoing or not, and use of technology or not (the digital divide).

Dante Chinni and James Gimpel have divided the United States into 12 distinct community types based on patterns in census and voting data. They have made these distinctions based on demographics such as population, age, race, income and education as well as voting behaviors over time. Rather than attempting to predict who is more likely to vote Republican or Democrat, these researchers look at how people vote, then analyzed their demographics and community lifestyles—in essence constructing community typologies based on historical voting patterns rather than attempting to predict voting patterns based on the characteristics of individual voters. In descending order of population, these communities are:

Monied Burbs:  286 counties and 69.1 million people. These communities enjoy higher than average incomes and educational levels, and tend to be areas of job (and population) growth. Monied Burbs have the highest percentage of college graduates as well as post-graduate degrees. Other than higher incomes and educational levels, however, Monied Burbs are statistically “average” with respect to the national composition of age, race and religion.  These communities tend to weather recessions better than the rest of the country and also help to “pull the country out of it.”

Boom Towns:  384 counties and 59.3 million people. These are areas which had been growing and relatively wealthy, but were also hardest hit by the Great-Recession housing collapse. They still tend to have higher median incomes, with residents employed in professional and executive positions as well as in the more stable occupations of education and government. They also tend to be younger than the nation as a whole, and slightly more diverse (84% white as opposed to the national average of 87%).

Industrial Metropolises: Only 41 counties, but 53.9 million people. These communities are densely populated, younger, and more racially diverse. They tend to have greater income divergence (very high and very low incomes, with an average that is close to the national average), which is correlated with race.  In spite of the “industrial” label, occupations in these areas have bifurcated into professional jobs and service jobs. Industrial Metropolis residents attend college at a higher than national rate (25% versus 16% nationally).

Service Worker Centers: 663 counties and 31 million people. These areas are frequently mid-size towns, neither really “rural” nor really “urban.” Jobs are impermanent, low-paying and lack employee benefits. However, the cost of living is not necessarily low, and many workers here live paycheck-to-paycheck.  Service Worker Centers are slowly losing population—no one really moves here for work because of higher-than-average unemployment rates, and the jobs that exist are unappealing. They are concentrated in the Northeast, the Northwest, and upper Midwest, and racially are mostly White. These communities often have a higher-than-average proportion of “tourist” income, so their economic welfare depends to a larger extent on how the rest of the country is doing (and spending). Voters tend to lean Republican, but not by large margins.

Immigration Nation:  204 counties with 20.7 million people.  These areas are concentrated in the Southwest (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and South Texas). They have higher than average Hispanic populations, with lower than average incomes and higher rates of poverty. These areas are hit hardest by “boom and bust” cycles in housing and construction. The authors predict that, “the tensions over labor…will likely intensify if economic times stay tough [and] high unemployment endures in the long term.”

Evangelical Epicenters:  468 counties and 14.1 million people. These communities are concentrated in the mid-South-West (Arkansas, Oklahoma, Alabama, Missouri and East-Central Texas). They are characterized by young families and evangelical Christians. Incomes are lower than national average.  The authors suggest that these are the so-called “values voters,” who tend to believe abortion should be illegal (21%) and seek communities with “strong family values.”

Minority Central:  364 counties and 13.5 million people. These communities contain much larger than average percentages of African Americans or Native Americans. They are located primarily in the Deep South or in connection with Native Nation reservations (the Arizona-New Mexico border, North and South Dakota). They have lower than average incomes and higher than average poverty rates, along with high unemployment and low college enrollment. However, there is a distinct disparity in the incomes of minority and white populations, reflecting vestiges of racial segregation.

Campus and Careers:  71 counties with 13.1 million people. These are so-called “college towns” that are scattered throughout the country. As the name implies, these communities have a lot of college students and young people starting careers.  While incomes are not particularly high, neither are poverty rates. Jobs pay decently and employment tends to be stable. These communities also tend to have higher rates of Internet and technology usage.

Empty Nesters:  250 counties and 12.1 million people.  These communities are located primarily in the upper Midwest (Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota) and Florida. Populations are older, many who are living on fixed incomes. Empty Nesters are “solidly white and solidly middle class,” many who had been (or are still) employed in manufacturing.  Although these people are not wealthy, they enjoy slightly higher than average incomes and lower poverty rates. Many of them grew up in an era of strong unions, a healthy middle class, and secure retirements.

Military Bastions:  55 counties and 8.4 million people. These are a small number of communities scattered throughout the country that are located near military bases—which are the major source of jobs in these areas. The soldiers (and their paychecks) are usually welcomed by the regular residents, although the neighboring towns experience disruption when soldiers are deployed overseas for long periods of time. In addition to the soldiers, these communities also attract high-dollar military contractors, which the authors allege could make them “Republican-leaning versions of Campus and Career communities.”

Tractor Country: 311 counties with 2.3 million people. Tractor Country is sparsely populated, and residents earn their livelihoods primarily in farming and agribusiness. They are concentrated in the upper Midwest and middle of the country (North and South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska and Kansas), with a few counties scattered in Washington, Oregon and Texas. In addition to the Deep South, these are the quintessentially “red” counties. After Mormon communities, it is the least diverse, being mostly (96%) white. Incomes are lower than national average, but so is the cost of living.  The authors call Tractor Country residents “Progressive Conservatives.” These communities are conservative in their distrust of Washington, their fiscal frugality, and their appreciation for hard work. Yet, they also are strong supporters of their local communities and are willing to help out neighbors in need. Tractor Country was relatively unaffected by the housing collapse and financial crisis—mainly because most of the banks are small and locally owned. However, family-owned farms are increasingly being replaced by industrialized agriculture, which the authors predict will “change the nature of life in these communities.” Tractor Country is also losing about 2% of its population per year, and 40% of its residents are over age 50.

Mormon Outposts: 44 counties with 1.7 million people.  These communities have high proportions of members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Although Mormons are a religious minority (comprising about 2% of the U.S. population), they have settled in a finite area mainly in the states of Utah, Southern Idaho and Western Wyoming, where their insular communities allow them to maintain their religion and culture. The vast majority are white (96%).  About 11% of Mormon communities work in agriculture, making them the second (after Tractor Country) most rural community group. They are, however, economically better off than their rural counterparts in Tractor Country and their fellow churchgoing Evangelicals, with slightly higher than average incomes and slightly lower than average poverty rates.

The strongest support for Democrats is in Industrial Metropolises, followed by Campus and Careers. Surprisingly, Service Workers tend to support Republicans by a small degree, and both Immigrant and Minority communities were about equally divided in past elections, but the Democrats have been gaining in all three of these groups more recently. The authors allege that Service Worker Centers are “the economy’s canaries in the coal mine”…  When things go bad, they go bad here first.”

The strongest Republican support is in Mormon, Evangelical and Tractor Country communities, which suggests a cultural rather than an economic bias.  Boom Towns, Empty Nesters, and Military communities have favored the Republicans by small amounts in the past, but Democratic support in these communities has also been increasing.

The truest “swing” communities have been the Monied Burbs—favoring Republicans in one election and Democrats in the next, with support for Democrats apparently growing since 1980. Monied Burb constituents are thus the most sought-after voter, both for their higher incomes and for their general lack of diehard party loyalty. Because of their sheer numbers and shifting electoral preferences, Monied Burbs, Boom Towns and Service Worker communities offer the greatest potential for electoral change.